A New Branch of the Armed Forces is Critical to Addressing Cyber Threats to America | Opinion

While there's no shortage of threats to our national security, it's the ability of our adversaries to affect Americans through cyberspace that has emerged as one of the most pressing concerns of the 21st century. The United States Armed Forces need a coherent solution to the looming threat of debilitating cyber attacks today and a path forward to leverage the field of cyber to our advantage on the battlefield of tomorrow.

As a former United States Air Force officer, I was taught the history of military aviation and specifically the era before the Air Force's establishment in 1947. Through the 1920s and 1930s, when the Army was largely charged with managing military aviation, its leaders (frequently non-aviators from the ground forces) downplayed, diminished, and underappreciated the revolutionary potential of air warfare. Collectively, the limited vision and poor understanding by Army leaders of the new domain led to the treatment of aviation as a mere support function to the Army's ground formations. After the Army's repeated aviation-related missteps in WWII, the full promise of air power was finally realized, leading to the independent U.S. Air Force we have today.

Ironically, the Air Force mismanaged space responsibilities by falling prey to many of these fundamental mistakes. For nearly 30 years, the Air Force failed to invest in critical space capabilities, neglected essential national requirements, and generally under-appreciated the potential for the space domain. History repeated itself when escalating frustration with the Air Force's fumbles culminated in the establishment of the U.S. Space Force in 2019.

We could avoid further misallocation of time and resources by getting to work on establishing a U.S. Cyber Force here and now. While the terminology and tactics are unique to the domain of cyberspace, the question of how we organize for the fight and our understanding of the associated shortcomings are simple to understand.

Take, for example, a world in which the U.S. Navy did not exist. If the leaders of each of the services were told to go off and build warships that met a single set of requirements, would we believe that they'd each return with four identical platforms?

Not likely, since they'd each return hopefully with things that float but otherwise bear no resemblance to each other, owing to each service's unique priorities and culture.

Would that lack of uniformity make sense in a combat setting?

Absolutely not.

Cyberspace isn't all that different, except today, each service generally builds cyber capacity in isolation. The forces are also supposed to be built to a single standard, but that intent or vision has never come to fruition, with dramatic disparities across the services. In fact, they don't even align on the names of the career fields for personnel aligned to cyber operations.

While seemingly minor, the consequences are significant.

In 2022, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that while the services track cyber personnel staffing to a degree, the way each does so differs widely. The organizations responsible for staffing the units conducting cyberspace operations can't even track whether the given roles they are meant to fill are staffed adequately or inadequately.

It's critical we establish an independent military service aligned to cyberspace, responsible for the Title 10 functions of "Organize, Train, and Equip."

The concept of a United States Cyber Force has been proposed in one form or another for more than a decade. Perhaps the most well-known advocate is ADM James G. Stavridis, retired NATO Supreme Allied Commander and the former Commander of both European and Southern Commands, who has highlighted many of the salient obstacles to the creation of a U.S. Cyber Force. These include the lack of incentives to prioritize cyber matters, the uniqueness of recruiting individuals with the skillset to perform such roles, and the lack of a shared culture when such efforts are divided among the existing branches of the military.

These same issues highlighted by ADM Stavridis are no less significant today but are apparently more stubborn than previously understood. Since 2014, Congress has repeatedly attempted to solve these issues by providing tools, authorities, and resources to the Defense Department. In fact, there have been 45 separate provisions enacted to address the civilian and military workforce dilemma and 24 attempts to fix readiness shortfalls. Despite this, little progress has been made.

Congress' failure to affect change has only solidified the view that the military's existing structure is incapable of defending American interests in cyberspace with the same dedication as we do in other national security domains.

To remedy this structural miasma, a bipartisan coalition of lawmakers is pursuing legislation in support of a Cyber Force. Our priority in this year's National Defense Authorization Act utilizes an independent, objective approach to evaluate how a notional, unified Cyber Force would compare to the present, fragmented approach by each of the four services.

If we want to ensure U.S. military dominance in cyberspace, past experience and evidence make clear that a United States Cyber Force is in the best interests of the nation.

Congressman Pat Fallon represents Texas' Fourth Congressional District. An Air Force veteran, he is a member of the House Armed Services Committee and the Committee on Oversight and Accountability.